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ABSTRACT In this paper, a novel data-driven information hiding scheme called “generative 
steganography by sampling” (GSS) is proposed. Unlike in traditional modification-based 
steganography, in our method the stego image is directly sampled by a powerful generator: no 
explicit cover is used. Both parties share a secret key used for message embedding and extraction. 
The Jensen-Shannon divergence is introduced as a new criterion for evaluating the security of 
generative steganography. Based on these principles, we propose a simple practical generative 
steganography method that uses semantic image inpainting. The message is written in advance to 
an uncorrupted region that needs to be retained in the corrupted image. Then, the corrupted image 
with the secret message is fed into a Generator trained by a generative adversarial network (GAN) 
for semantic completion. Message loss and prior loss terms are proposed for penalizing message 
extraction error and unrealistic stego image. In our design, we first train a generator whose 
training target is the generation of new data samples from the same distribution as that of existing 
training data. Next, for the trained generator, backpropagation to the message and prior loss are 
introduced to optimize the coding of the input noise data for the generator. The presented 
experiments demonstrate the potential of the proposed framework based on both qualitative and 
quantitative evaluations of the generated stego images. 
 
INDEX TERMS Generative adversarial network, Image inpainting, Steganography  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Fridrich’s groundbreaking work of modern steganography[1], the possible steganographic 
channel are divided into three categories: cover selection, cover modification and cover  
synthesis. A cover selection method , likes an image retrieval method, retrieves stego images from 
real image database based on their fitness to carry a given secret image. In such a method, the 
cover image is not modified, it is not susceptible to existing steganalysis technology. However, 
such methods are not suitable for practical applications because of its low payload. Cover 
modification is the most studied class of methods to data. In terms of the Kullback–Leibler (KL) 
divergence  as a security metric, such methods can achieve ε-security or perfect security for only 
certain explicit models. These methods, such as those presented in [2,3], face challenges in 
resisting steganalysis [4]. The third set of methods, cover synthesis seems more consistent with the 
earliest Cardan grille method [1]. In theory, cover synthesis is the most flexible and powerful 
because synthetic cover data can be adapted to the message of interest without restriction. In 
practice, however, cover synthesis is so difficult to automate that almost all known practical 
systems use modification-based methods instead.  
Fortunately, a new class of data-based sampling tools called generative adversarial network 
(GAN) [5] has emerged that, is able to generate better synthetic images than previous generative 
models and has consequently become a new focus of research in artificial intelligence. The goal of 
a GAN is to estimate the potential distribution of existing data and then generate new data samples 
from the same distribution. A GAN consists of two neural networks, a generator and a discriminator, 
the generator tries to produce realistic samples that will fool the discriminator, while the 
discriminator tries to distinguish real samples from generated ones. Currently, GANs are widely used 
for computer vision [5], image synthesis [22], [23], natural language processing [13] and other areas, 
but are seldomly used in image steganography .  
Inspired by Cardan grilles and GANs, in this paper, we will show that cover synthesis 
steganography can be viewed as a special case of image synthesis and will propose a new 
framework called generative steganography by sampling (GSS), in which the stego image is 
directly sampling by a well-trained image generator. Given a trained generative model, we search 
for the closest encoding of the stego image in the latent image manifold using a message loss and 
a prior losses, which are introduced as constraints on the sampling conditions to penalize message 
extraction error and unrealistic images. This encoding is then passed through the generative model 
to generate a carrier image.  Based on this new framework, a practical cover synthesis method is 
proposed that is based on a mask called digital Cardan grille and semantic image inpainting. The 
digital Cardan grille is used to determine the location in which to hide the message. The message 
is written in advance into an uncorrupted region that needs to be retained in the corrupted image 
based on the digital Cardan grille. Then, the corrupted image with the secret message is fed into a 
GAN to provide constraints for stego image generation. Back-propagation to the input noise 
vector is employed in our approach to find the encoding that is closest to the provided corrupted 
image. The constrained sampling process not only reconstructs the corrupted image but also 
generates a rational stego image with desired image content.  
This paper has the following contributions: 
1. We propose a data-driven framework for steganography based on training a generator with a 
large amount of data, thereby simplifying the design of steganography schemes. We treat cover 
synthesis steganography as a constrained image synthesis problem and take advantage of the 
recent advances in generative modeling. The message loss and the prior loss terms are proposed 
for penalizing message extraction error and unrealistic stego image. The steganographic process is 
largely automatable, and we can obtain a large number of stego images via sampling from the 
generator. This approach can also be extended to other media, such as text, audio and video.  
2. We define a new criterion for steganographic security using the Jensen-Shannon (JS) 
divergence between the real-image distribution preal and the stego-image distribution pstego which 
used to measure how close these two distributions are to each other. Instead of ignoring the 
distribution of the real image, as in traditional cover modification steganography, we can define a 
random variable z with a fixed distribution p(z) and pass it through a parametric function Gstego 
(typically a neural network of some kind) that directly generates stego image following a certain 
distribution pstego. By using GAN, in the ideal case, pstego = preal can be achieved, corresponding to 
statistically perfect stegnographic security. 
3. Unlike texture-based methods, semantic image synthesis technology is used to ensure the 
rationality of the cover contents. Compared with our previous work, the new digital Cardan grille 
method proposed in this paper not only converges faster but also reduces visual distortion. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the related work on cover 
synthesis steganography. Section III describes the proposed method. Section IV presents the 
experimental results and analysis. Conclusions are presented in Section V. 
II.  RELATED WORK  
Fridrich, et al. [1] were the first to investigate a cover synthesis method. With the help of texture 
synthesis, the authors of [6, 7] used a texture sample and a set of color points generated based on a 
secret messages to construct a dense texture images. Qian, et al. [8, 9] proposed a robust method 
of steganography based on texture synthesis. Xue, et al. [10] used marbling, a unique texture 
synthesis method that allows users to deliver personalized messages hidden within beautiful, 
decorative textures. This type of texture-based steganography is based on the premise that the 
cover does not have to represent real-world content (which is counterintuitive for steganography, 
whose objective is typically to maintain the nature of the cover). Similar to [1], Zhou, et al. [11] 
proposed a cover selection method based on a bag-of-words model (BOW) in which a set of 
subimages with visual words related to the textual information is found. Then, the portions of the 
image containing these subimages are used as stego images for secret communication. Li et al.[36] 
propose a construction-based data hiding technique which transforms a secret message into a 
fingerprint image directly. They generates the fingerprint image based on a piece of hologram phase 
constructed from the secret message.  
Recently, adversarial training has been applied to steganography. Volkhonskiy, et al. [12] 
proposed a new model for generating image-like containers based on a deep convolutional 
generative adversarial network (DCGAN) [13]. This approach generates embedded messages that 
are more secure against steganalysis using standard cover modification algorithms. Similar to [12], 
Shi, et al. [14] introduced a new GAN design with improved the convergence speed, training 
stability and image quality. Abadi [15] used adversarial training to teach two neural networks to 
encrypt a short message that would fool a discriminator. Tang, et al. [16] proposed an automatic 
steganographic distortion learning framework using a GAN composed of a steganographic 
generative subnetwork and a steganalytic discriminative subnetwork. However, most of these 
GAN-based steganographic schemes still function based on the principle of cover modification. 
Similar to [15], the authors of [17] defined a game among three parties—Alice, Bob and Eve—to 
simultaneously train both a steganographic algorithm and a steganalyzer. However, this scheme 
still trains Alice to learn to produce a steganographic image using a modification scheme. These 
methods focus on the adversarial game while ignoring the core aim of the GAN—to build a 
powerful sampler. 
Because a GAN's greatest advantage is sample generation, it seems intuitive to use a GAN to 
generate a semantic carrier image directly. However, the question of how to embed secret message 
in an image generated by GAN  is a key issue. Some researchers have made preliminary attempts 
to apply this intuitive idea. Ke et al.[18] first proposed a generative steganography method called 
GSK, in which the secret messages are embedded into a generated cover image rather than an 
existing cover, thus resulting in no modifications in the cover. In [18], the term “generative 
steganography” was first introduced. Liu, et al. [19] proposed a method in which an auxiliary 
classifier GAN (ACGAN) [20] is applied to classify the generated samples and the class output 
information is used as the secret message. Hu, et al.[31] propose a method called steganography 
without embedding (SWE), in which the secret information is mapped to a noise vector and 
trained neural network model is used as a generator to generate a carrier image based on the noise 
vector. In the method proposed in our previous work [21], the secret message is written into the 
corrupted area of a corrupted image that needs to be filled in a grille mask; then, the corrupted 
stego image is fed into a GAN for stego generation.  
 
III.  GENERATIVE  STEGANOGRAPHY FRAMEWORK   
The generative steganography framework proposed in this paper is illustrated in Fig. 1. In this scenario, 
the sender directly creates a stego carrier using a generator with a message and a key. Here, the 
embedding algorithm becomes a stego sampling (generation) process. The secret key shared by both 
parties ensures the security of message extraction, and the degree of naturalness of the stego image 
determines the security of the communication channel. 
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FIGURE 1. Generative steganography framework. 
A. REPRESENTATION FORMULA 
Ideally, a generative steganography scheme should satisfy the following three conditions, which we call 
the generative steganography conditions (GSC): 
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 ),(Ext ksm  ,                                  (2) 
realstego pp  ,                                    (3) 
where s denotes the fake stego carrier, m denotes the message, and k is the secret information shared by 
the two parties. Eq. (1) represents the embedding procedure, Gen(·) is a generator, indicating that the 
scheme involves generative steganography. Note that the stego image s is sampled by the generator 
without requiring an explicit cover image. Ext(·) in Eq.(2) denotes the message extraction operation. In 
Eq.(3), pstego and preal denote the distributions of the sampled stego carrier and the real data, respectively. 
Ideally, pstego=preal, this condition guarantees the statistical security of the communication channel, 
which is a key issue for a generator to be used for generative steganography. There are two main tasks 
in generative steganography. One is to construct a generator that can generate stego images such that 
the generated stego samples are subject to the same distribution as the real image distribution. Second, 
a message extraction algorithm must be designed. In this paper, we use a GAN to achieve the first goal. 
We also constrain the generation process to simplify the design of the message extraction algorithm. 
Interestingly, if we assume that all these conditions are satisfied, then generative steganography can be 
treated as a cover selection method in which it is possible to construct a fake database of infinite size in 
which every sample contains a secret message. 
B. A MEASURE OF SECURITY 
We are motivated by the notion of ε-secure steganography proposed by Cachin [30], in which the 
relative entropy (also called the KL divergence) between the cover and stego distributions is less than 
or equal to ε. The KL divergence measures how one probability distribution diverges from another 
expected probability distribution. Fridrich [1] also introduced a formal information theoretic definition 
of security in steganography based on the KL divergence between the distributions of the cover and 
stego objects: 
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where pcover and pstego are the cover and stego distributions, respectively. However, the KL divergence 
does not satisfy the symmetric and triangle inequality conditions, and it cannot be strictly considered a 
metric. Thus, the security of different steganographic images cannot be evaluated in terms of this 
divergence. In this paper, a new measure of security is defined using the Jensen-Shannon (JS) 
divergence, which is based on the KL divergence but exhibits several notable (and useful) differences, 
including that it is symmetric and always  has a finite value. The JS divergence is defined as follows: 
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The JS divergence between two probability distributions is bounded by 1 if the base 2 logarithm: 
1)(0 cov  erstegoJS ppD .                        (7) 
When pstego = pcover, the JS divergence is zero. 
In generative steganography, we can use this metric to evaluate which generator is closest to a real 
data distribution. This means that we can sample a secure stego image using the best generator. In fact, 
the generator used in the study that introduced the concept of GANs [5] was trained based on the JS 
divergence; in this case, the adversarial game gradually reduces the divergence between the generator 
distribution pg and the data distribution pdata with an increasing number of adversarial iterations. In 
generative steganography, the stego image is generated by the generator G. Therefore, pg and pstego have 
same meanings, and pcover is the same as pdata. Because no explicit cover exists in our scheme, we use 
pdata instead of pcover. 
Similar to Cachin's ε-security for steganography [30], we define the concept of ε- security for 
generative steganography system based on the JS divergence : 
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When introducing the GAN concept[5], Goodfellow et al. proved that if generator G and discriminator 
D have sufficient capacity, the discriminator can reach its optimum given G, and pg is updated to 
improve its generation ability, then pg converges to pdata, which also means that pstego converges to pdata. 
Ideally, when the generator is optimal (i.e., ε = 0) the system can be regarded as perfectly statistically 
secure against steganalysis.  
Under the generative steganography framework, we want find approximations to the real image 
distribution pdata (which is complex and intractable) in the form of a (tractable) approximate 
distribution pstego. In KL divergence, the term pstegolog[ pstego/pdata] appears in the integrand. When 
pdata is small, this divergence grows very rapidly if pstego is not also small. Thus, if one is 
choosing pstego to minimize DKL(pstego||pdata), it’s very improbable that  pstego will assign much mass 
on regions where pdata is near zero. By contrast, the JS divergence does not have this property. It is 
well behaved when both pdata and pstego are small. This means that it will not apply as strong 
penalty to a distribution pstego from which it is possible to sample values that are impossible in pdata. 
Admittedly, the JS divergence is also not an ideal choice. If two distributions pdata and pstego are so 
far apart that there is no overlap at all, then the KL divergence is meaningless, whereas the JS 
divergence has a constant value. This behavior is essentially fatal in gradient-based learning 
algorithms because it means that the gradient at this point is zero. Arjovsky proposed an 
alternative, called Wasserstein GAN (WGAN) [32], which leverages the Wasserstein distance to 
produce a value function with better theoretical properties than the JS divergence. However, since a 
DCGAN is used to generate stego images later in this paper and the JS divergence is used in DCGAN, 
we use the JS divergence as our standard for security evaluation in this paper. Nevertheless, it should 
be noted that this is not the only option in the context of generative steganography frameworks.   
C． CONSTRAINED SAMPLING 
Currently, the state-of-the-art methods of cover modification steganography can be viewed as a 
constrained coding problem of minimizing the distortion between the cover and stego images through 
syndrome trellis coding (STC) [4]. The embedding and extraction mappings are realized using a binary 
linear code C of length n and dimension n - m:  
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where x is the cover, m denotes the message, and y is the stego image. D(x, y) is the distortion function. 
H is a parity-check matrix of the code ζ ,and )(mζ  is the coset corresponding to syndrome m. Emb(.) 
and Ext(.) denote the embedding and extraction operations, respectively. The embedding operation 
involves finding an optimal solution to the problem of finding a stego image y that satisfies the 
message extraction conditions while simultaneously minimizing the distortion. The Viterbi algorithm 
can provide an optimal solution to the embedding problem. Such steganography implementations that 
lack a shared secret are forms of security through obscurity, which relies on the secrecy of either the 
design or the implementation as the main approach for providing security for a system or a component 
of a system. 
In our generative steganography method, cover synthesis steganography is treated as a constrained 
image generation problem, and we take advantage of recent advances in generative modeling. Here, we 
provide a representation of the optimization problem for generative steganography: 
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where Gen(.) is a generator trained by a GAN, and Ck is an extraction matrix based on the secret key k. 
Importantly, unlike in the STC method, no explicit cover x is necessary as shown in Eq.(13). The stego 
image y does not depend on any specific cover; instead, it can be regarded as a sample from a generator 
distribution pstego. Rather than estimating the density of pdata, which may not exist, the GAN defines a 
random variable z with a fixed distribution pz and pass it through a parametric generator Gθ that directly 
generates samples y = Gθ(z) following a certain distribution pstego. By varying θ, we can modify this 
distribution to bring it closer to the real data distribution pdata. Note that our scheme is also 
key-dependent and adheres to Kerckhoff's principle. In the next section, we will present a practical 
algorithm that reveals the details of Ck. In generative steganography, we not only require the JS 
divergence between pstego and pdata to be as small as possible, as shown in Eq.(13), but also require the 
generator to satisfy the request for message extraction, as shown in Eq. (14).  
In our constrained image generation scheme, the generative steganography procedure is implemented 
in two steps. First, we train a generator with GAN, as shown in Fig. 2(a). As discussed in Section III.B, 
the training target is to minimize DJS(pstego, pdata). Ideally, the training process will  reach the state in 
which pstego = pdata.  
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FIGURE 2. Constrained stego sampling (a) training a generator with a GAN; (b) sampling a stego image with constraints. 
Next, we use the trained generator to search for stego images. More specifically, we formulate the 
process of finding the stego image y as a constrained sampling problem. The objective of this problem 
is to generate the message carrier directly from the noise z via generator. This secret carrier needs to 
satisfy two constraints: the stego image must be sufficiently realistic, and the stego image needs to 
contain the desired messages. In this paper, we use these two constraints to update and sample z, to 
achieve the purpose of generating the secret carrier. Let m be the message, and let k be a secret key 
shared by the two communicating parties. Using this notation, we define the “closest” encoding zˆ  as 
follows: 
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where Lm denotes the message loss, which constrains the generated image given the message m and the 
extraction key k; Lp denotes the prior loss, which penalizes unrealistic images; and λ is a 
hyperparameter that controls the importance of the prior loss relative to the message loss, as shown in 
Fig. 2(b). Backpropagation to the input data is introduced to optimize the coding of the input data z for 
the DCGAN:  
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As Eq. (16) and (17) show, we iteratively update z using backpropagation. After sufficient training 
iterations, the input data z for the GANs are optimized to minimize the loss. We obtain the generated 
stego image )ˆ(zy G . The details of the proposed loss function are discussed in the following sections.  
 
IV. GENERATIVE STEGANOGRAPHY BY INPAINTING  
Semantic inpainting [22] refers to the task of inferring arbitrarily large missing regions in images based 
on image semantics. Since high-level context prediction is required, this task is significantly more 
difficult than classical inpainting or image completion which is often more concerned with correcting 
spurious data corruption or removing entire objects. As far as we know, we are the first to note the 
similarity between image completion and Cardan-grille-based secret writing. Under the guidance of 
this constrained sampling framework, inspired by image inpainting and the Cardan grille approach, we 
propose a practical generative steganography method based on semantic inpainting .  
The proposed steganography method consists of four phases, as illustrated in Fig. 3. In the first phase, 
we train a DCGAN on an image set and obtain a generator G after DCGAN convergence. After 
training, the generator G is able to take a point z drawn from pz and generate an image that mimics 
samples from pdata. In the second phase, a constraint sampling condition is established by embedding a 
secret message into a corrupted image. In this paper, the message is written into the uncorrupted image 
region that must be preserved in the corrupted image through bit-plane embedding; the corrupted stego 
image will play an important role in the next phase, in which the purpose is to find natural stego images 
though iterative sampling. In the third phase, using the defined prior and context losses for completion 
and the message loss for steganography, the corrupted stego image can be mapped to the closest z in the 
latent representation space, which we denote by zˆ . In this study, z is randomly initialized and updated 
using backpropagation on the total loss. The process of information hiding is consistent with the basic 
idea of the traditional Cardan grille: the sender defines a mask, called a digital Cardan grille, to 
determine where the message is hidden, and ⊙ denotes the elementwise product operation between 
two data matrices. In the last phase, the stego image y can be easily obtained as )ˆ(zy G , and a 
well-filled stego image is transmitted to the recipient through a public channel. The receiver extracts 
the secret message in the reconstructed image using the Cardan grille shared by the two parties. The 
core requirement for this method is to define a generator that can ensure not only the consistency of the 
secret messages but also the natural appearance of the stego images. In fact, it is feasible to use noise to 
generate images directly without using image completion technology, but the advantage of image 
completion is that we can control more of the details of image generation, giving the sender more 
selectivity, instead of giving the sampler all the selectivity.  
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FIGURE 3. The proposed generative steganography by sampling method using the Cardan grille. 
 
Before constructing the practical generative steganography algorithm, we first assume that the 
generator meet the condition DJS (pstego, pdata) = 0 or DJS(pstego, pdata) <ε; This condition can be reached 
by training a generator with a GAN as shown in step1 in Fig.3  Then, we can focus on how to design a 
scheme to ensure that the messages can be extracted correctly. In this paper, the process of sampling the 
stego image is decomposed into three steps to simplify the design. 
A. MESSAGE PREPROCESSING 
The objective of message preprocessing is to establish constrained sampling conditions. We define an 
expansion operation called Expand(.): 
)(' mm Expand .                              (18) 
m is the original secret message, and m’ is a semifinished stego carrier containing the secret message m. 
Secret message m can be extracted via the message extraction operation with the extraction key k:  
),'(Ext kmm  .                                (19) 
In this paper, we construct a semifinished stego carrier based on corrupted image in image completion.  
First, we select the corrupted image Icorrupted, which has dimensions of m n, along with the secret 
message m and the Cardan grille Ck. Ck is a key shared by both parties. A Cardan grille with the same 
size is defined as follows: 
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where cij∈{0,1}, A value of 1 represents a parts of the image where we want to hide the message, and 
a value of 0 represents a part of the image that we cannot embed to. Ideally, the Cardan grille should be 
designed to have a m n  bit key, where the key length coincides with the lower bound on the 
algorithm's security. It is important to note that the structure and location of this Cardan grille in the 
corrupted image are shared by both parties.  
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FIGURE 4. Flowchart of building the constraint conditions. 
 
Then, the message can be written into the uncorrupted regions of the input image in accordance with 
the Cardan grille, as shown in Fig. 4. We obtain a corrupted image Icorrupted_stego which containing the 
secret message (denoted by m’). Note that  m = m’ ⊙ Ck , where ⊙ denotes the elementwise product 
operation. The preprocessing is important because it transforms the image completion process into 
steganography. Then, we can obtain the final stego carrier using  
),'(Gen kms  .                                 (21) 
In the next subsection, we will present details on how to realize the Gen() operation based on the GAN 
approach and image completion, thus completing the generative steganography procedure. 
B. FINDING AN ENCODING. 
As mentioned above, an image completion method used for steganography should satisfy two 
objectives: one is to preserve the rationality of the complete image content and the other is to provide a 
stable message. In this paper, we use the image inpainting method proposed by Yeh [22] based on 
DCGAN [13] for image completion. A binary mask M, which contains values of 0 or 1, is used for 
image completion. A value of 1 represents a part of the image that we want to keep, and a value of 0 
represents a part of the image that we want to complete. To complete the image while hiding the 
message, we designed three losses. 
Contextual Loss: To fill in large missing regions, similar to Ye’s method [22], our method takes 
advantage of the remaining available data. To maintain the same context as in the input image, we want 
to ensure that the known pixel locations in the input image Icorrupted_stego will be similar to the pixels in 
G(z). We need to penalize G(z) when it does not create a similar image with respect to the pixels we 
know about. Formally, we do this by subtracting the pixels in Icorrupted_stego from G(z) in an elementwise 
fashion and assessing how much they differ: 
1
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where ||.||1 is the L1-norm. In the ideal case, all the pixels at known locations will be identical between 
Icorrupted_stego and G(z). In this case, G(z)i – (Icorrupted_stego) i = 0 for the known pixels i; thus, Lcontextual (z) = 
0. 
Perceptual Loss: For an image to be considered to have  a realistic appearance, the discriminator 
must be convinced that the image is real. We test this condition using the same criterion used when 
training the DCGAN: 
)))((1log()( zz GDLperceptual  .                       (23) 
The contextual loss and the perceptual loss successfully predict the semantic information in the missing 
region and achieve pixel-level photorealism. 
Message Loss: The key to using image completion for information hiding is that the messages 
extracted with the Cardan mask Ck should be as stable as possible. The pixel values at the 
corresponding positions in the generated image should be equal to the values  in the secret message: 
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In the ideal case, all the pixels at the hiding locations should be identical between m’ and G(z). In this 
case, G(z)i – m’i = 0 for the known pixels i; thus, Lmessage (z) = 0. The notation indicates that the 
steganography in performed in a bit plane. We define a bit plane index BPI (BPI = 1,..., 8.) to indicate 
the layer  in which the message is located, BPI = 1 represents the least significant bit (LSB), and BPI 
= 8 represents the most significant bit (MSB). In the case that Icorrupted_stego = m’, Ck = M. Lmessage is the 
same as Lcontextual. It is important to note that M and Ck play different roles in stego image generation: M 
is used for image inpainting, and Ck is used for hiding information. The size and value of Ck can differ 
from those of M. In practice, for each 8-bit pixel point in each layer, we cannot guarantee that the 
generator will converge to a model that can successfully satisfy Lmessage (z) = 0. Intuitively, we expect 
that the lower bits will be more strongly affected by pixel generation, while higher bits will have 
greater stability. The elementwise product ⊙ operates at the bit-plane level. 
Finally, we can find zˆ  using a combination of all these losses as follows: 
)()()()( zzzz messagecontextualperceptual LλLLL  ,          (25) 
)(minargˆ zz L ,                            (26) 
where λ is a hyperparameter that controls the importance of the message loss relative to the perceptual 
loss and contextual loss. Back-propagation to the input noise z is employed in our approach to find the 
encoding that is closest to the provided corrupted stego image. 
C. MESSAGE EXTRACTION 
For the message receiver, message extraction is simple. The basic process is shown in Fig. 5. 
The receiver places the grille directly on the generated image to extract the secret message in the 
corresponding position. The extraction operation is  
BPICG ])([ kzm ⊙ .                         (27) 
The notation indicates in which bit plane the extraction operation is performed. 
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FIGURE 5. Message extraction using a Cardan grille 
 
V. EXPERIMENTS 
In this section, we evaluate our experimental results both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
A. DATASETS AND SETTINGS 
We implemented our adversarial training scheme on the LFW dataset [23], a database of face 
photographs designed for studying the problem of unconstrained facial recognition. This dataset 
contains more than 13,000 images of faces collected from the web. We also use the CelebFaces 
Attributes (CelebA) dataset which is a large-scale face attributes dataset with more than 200k celebrity 
images, each with 40 attribute annotations to train the generator. For these two databases, we used an 
alignment tool to resize the images to 64×64 pixels, as shown in Fig. 6. The DCGAN model 
architecture used in this work was adopted from Yeh et al. [22]. We modified Brandon Amos’s 
implementation [24] for hiding information. We used 12,000 samples from LFW and 150,000 samples 
from CelebA to train the DCGAN and set the training parameters for image completion to the same 
values used by Brandon Amos. The generator G, takes a random 100-dimensional vector drawn from a 
uniform distribution in the range [-1; 1] and generates a 64 × 64 × 3 image. The discriminator model, D, 
is structured essentially in the reverse order. The input layer accepts a 64 × 64 × 3 image, and it is 
followed by a series of convolution layers; in each of these layers, the image dimensions diminish by 
half, but the number of channels is twice that in the previous layer. The output layer is a two-class 
softmax layer. We set λ = 0.1 in our experiments. In the stego generation stage, we need to find z using 
backpropagation. We used the Adam algorithm [35] for optimization and restricted z to [-1; 1] in each 
iteration because we found that this setting produced more stable results. We terminated the 
back-propagation process 1,000 iterations. We used identical settings for all tested datasets. The grille 
size was fixed to 64×64—the same size as the corrupted image. We intentionally randomized the secret 
message in all the uncorrupted regions in order to demonstrate the stability of the embedded messages 
in a quantitative manner. In the training phase, the model was run on a machine with an NVIDIA TiTan 
Xp GPU and 32GB of memory. We trained the DCGAN for 200 epochs on each ot the two datasets, 
CelebA and LWF, for 2 days and 1 day, respectively. 
 
(a) LWF 
 
(b) CelebA 
FIGURE 6. Aligned samples from the (a) LFW and (b) CelebA datasets 
 
We tested three random pattern masks with different mask shapes: 1) random pattern masks with 
approximately 20% missing, 2) randomly horizontal or vertical masks with 50% missing, and 3) 
completely random masks with 90% missing.  
B. VISUAL COMPARISONS 
Our results are shown in Fig. 7 and illustratie that our method can successfully predict the missing 
content given different random masks on the LWF and CelebA datasets. It is important to emphasize 
that in our experiment, the Cardan grille was randomly generated, and into all the locations available 
for hidden content, we wrote a message that was also randomly generated. Note that stego image 
generation (semantic inpainting in this case) is not an attempt to reconstruct the ground-truth image; 
instead, the goal is to fill in the holes with realistic content while hiding information. Even the 
ground-truth image is only one of many possibilities. 
 
(a) LWF 
 (b) CelebA 
FIGURE 7. For each example, column 1 shows the ground-truth image from the dataset, column 2 shows an images with random regions 
missing (row 1: 20%, row2: 50%, row3: 90%), column 3 shows Cardan grille mask, column 4 shows secret message, column 5 shows 
corrupted stego image with BPI = 1 and  column 6 shows the inpainting results obtained for the image in column 5 using our method. 
 
We show the complete image generation process in Fig. 8, where the number of iterations ranges 
from 20 to 2,000. We samples 8 generated stego images from the generator. Note that we the 
ground-truth images were chosen from the LFW dataset in Fig. 8 (a) and from CelebA dataset in Fig. 8 
(b). As shown in Fig. 8, meaningless severely corrupted images (with 90% missing) canbe transformed 
into samples consisten with pg. In the first few rounds, the visual quality of the generator output is low. 
The image becomes increasingly realistic as the number of iterations increases. At the same time, we 
can also see that the generated image quality achieved based on the CelebA database is better than the 
result of training using LWF database due to the use of more samples for training. It can also be seen 
from Fig. 8(b) that for corrupted images with different contents, In the early stage of iterative sampling, 
the images may be very similar, as in the cased of row 1 and row3. However, due to the use of different 
constraints, the images tend to have increasingly different contents as the number of iteration increases. 
 
(a) LWF 
 
(b) CelebA 
FIGURE 8. For each example, column 1 shows ground-truth image from the dataset; column 2 shows corrupted stego images which is 
missing a random regions comprising 90% of the image, and the Columns 3–10 show samples from the generator as the number of 
iterations increases. 
 
In Fig. 9, panels (a) and (b) show the message loss and the perceptual loss, respectively, for single 
image. All the stego images were sampled at 500 iterations from corrupted images with missing regions 
comprising 90% of the image. As seen in Fig. 9(a), during the first few sampling rounds, the visual 
quality of the output is low and the perceptual loss is high; however, after approximately 250 iterations, 
the perceptual loss causes the generated sample to become increasingly realistic and natural. As seen in 
Fig. 9 (b), the message loss becomes relatively smooth and stable after 150 iterations. This is mainly 
because we set the message loss to have more influence on the total loss. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
FIGURE 9. The message loss and the perceptual loss. (a) perceptual loss (b) message loss 
 
We also present the results of completing the same image using different λ values in Fig. 10. 
Although the gaps between the generated stego images are initially large, the completion stego images 
tend to become increasingly similar as the number of iterations increases.  
 
 FIGURE 10. Multiple stego images generated for a single image. In each row, column 1 shows ground-truth image, column 2 shows 
corrupted stego images with random missing regions comprising  90% of the image, and columns 3–10 show samples generated as the 
number of iterations increases. 
C. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
Due to the nonconvexity of the models in the training scheme, we cannot guarantee that the generator 
will converge to a model that can enable perfect recovery the secret message from the steganographic 
image . Fig. 11(a) and (b) shows the relationships between the message extraction accuracy rate and the 
number of iterations with LWF.  
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 FIGURE 11. Message extraction accuracy rate for different corruption rate with BPI = 8  (a) 10%-90%, (b) 91%-99% (c) different BPI 
for  corruption rate 99% . 
 
We choose to embed the message in the highest pixel of the uncorrupted image (bit plane index = 8), 
and then use the generator to sample stego images. The stego images are sampled every 30 iterations in 
a total of 3000 iterations. The recovery accuracy increases as the number of sampling iteration numbers 
increases. Due to the randomness of pixel generation and the fact that the message constraint cannot be 
completely satisfied. As can be seen from the Fig.11(a) and (b), as the amount of embedding increases, 
the accuracy of message extraction decreases. As shown in Fig. 11(c), we also performed message 
embedding and extraction average accuracy at different BPIs for 1,000 images that were not in the 
training set. All the stego images were sampled over 3,000 iterations, starting with corrupted images 
with missing 99% regions of the image. As expected, the accuracy of message extraction increased as 
the BPI value increased. The receiver was able to recover more than 70% at BPI = 7. Fig. 11(c) shows 
the relationship between the average error rate and the BPI. Compared with our previous work reported 
in [21], the message extraction stability is improved.  
Currently, the steganography capacities of cover-synthesis methods are much lower than those of 
traditional embedding-based steganography methods. In our GSS method, message embedding is 
carried out on uncorrupted region of the image, and the message embedding is guaranteed by a 
message loss constraint, therefore the image has a high embedding capacity. We compare the 
steganography capacity of our method with other state-of-the-art cover selection and the 
cover-synthesis methods in Table 1, where the second column shows the absolute steganography 
capacity (steganography capacity per pixel), the third column gives the size of the stego image, and the 
last column is the relative steganography capacity (steganography capacity per pixel): 
 
Relative capacity = Absolute capacity/Size of the image              (28) 
 
TABLE 1. Steganography capacities of various methods. 
Reference Absolute Capacity 
(bytes/image) 
Image Size Relative Capacity 
(bytes/pixel) 
 [11] 3.72 ≥512×512 1.42e-5 
 [33] 1.125 512×512 4,29e-6 
[34] 2.25 512×512 8.58e-6 
[10] 64×64 800×800 6.40e-3 
[7] 1535~4300 1024×1024 1.46e-3~4.10e-3 
[31] ≥37.5 64×64 1.46e-3~4.10e-3 
Ours 18.3-135.4 64×64 1.49e-3~1.10e-2 
The relative capacity of our method is 1.49e-3~1.10e-2 bytes per pixel, where the lower and upper ends 
of this range correspond to image corrupted rates of 0.99 to 0.91, respectively, as shown in the last row 
of Table 1, In theory, the relative capacity of the proposed method can be higher, but under the message 
loss constraint in  the message, as shown in Fig. 11, extraction accuracy will be very low, so the high 
embedding amount does not have practical value, the actual capacity should be calculated as: 
Actual capacity = Relative capacity × Extraction rate                 (29) 
This is mainly because the message constraint conditions are based on the pixel values themselves. Due 
to the randomness of pixel generation and the fact that the message constraint cannot be completely 
satisfied, the actual embedding capacity is reduced. 
We also steganalyzed our GSS method using a blind steganalyzer in the spatial domain and an 
ensemble classifier. In this experiment, we used 686-dimensional SPAM features [25] and 
5,404-dimensional SCRMQ1 features [26] with an ensemble classifier [27] implemented based on 
random forests. The decision threshold for each base learner was adjusted to minimize the total 
detection error under equal priors on the training set [27]: 
))((
2
1
min MDFA FAE PPPP  ,                    (30) 
where PFA and PMD are the probabilities of false alarms and missed detections, respectively. We adjusted 
the threshold to L/2 because in practice, PE is currently regarded as the standard for evaluating the 
accuracy of steganalyzers. 
Unlike in traditional steganalyzers for the cover modification method, all 1,000 stego images and 
1,000 normal images were generated over 1,000 iterations from corrupted images via the image 
inpainting process. The database was randomly divided into two halves: one for training and the other 
for testing. We averaged the performances over ten random splits. Fig. 12 is a plot showing the 
evolution of the testing error PE as a function of the payload from 0.01 bits per pixel (bpp) to 0.05 bpp 
when BPI = 7. For comparision, this plot also includes the corresponding results for HUGO [28] and 
HILL [29], which are considered to be advanced steganographic methods that minimize distortion by 
means of STC.  
The results in Fig.12 show that steganography based on sampling can resist statistical steganographic 
analysis, mainly because the completed stego and normal images can be regarded as samples from the 
distribution pg. There is no pairwise relationship between the features extracted from the normal cover 
image and the stego image. As shown in Fig. 12, our method performs competitively with HUGO [28] 
and HILL [29] for cases with a low embedding rate. 
  (a)  
 
(b) 
FIGURE 12. Steganalyzer error PE for an ensemble classifier using (a) SPAM features and (b) SCRMQ1 features for five different 
payloads  with HUGO, HILL and our method. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, a generative steganography method is proposed in which the stego images are sampled by 
a well-trained generator, enabling them to resist statistical steganalysis. Inspired by the idea of the 
Cardan grille, we propose a practical method of generative steganography using image completion 
technology. The experimental results verify the promise of this simple method. It reduces the 
complexity of steganography design, allowing researchers in other fields to quickly build a 
steganographic system under this framework. However, the design of the generator, which is trained by 
an adversarial network, is still in its infancy. In this paper, we used a simple DCGAN for image 
synthesis. In future work, we will adopt a more powerful generator that will be able to automatically 
synthesizes more realistic images from either other images or text. The performance of the generator 
must be continually refined to ensure the security of generative steganography. 
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